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IN THE UTAH UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs.

Case No. 20060646-CA

BRIAN K. MILLER,
Defendant/Appellant.
SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF OF APPELLEE

This Court ordered supplemental briefing on the following question: Should this
Court consider the legal correctness of the trial court's restitution order under the version
of the act in effect at the time defendant committed the crimes that are the subject of the
order, Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-101 -501 (2002), or pursuant to the current version of
the act which became effective before the restitution order was entered, Utah Code Ann.
§ 77-38a-101- 501 (2005)? In response to an inquiry from defendant's counsel, the clerk
of the Court notified counsel that the Court's question concerned the definition of
"pecuniary damages" in the statute.
In brief, the answer is that the 2005 version, which is also the current version,
defining "pecuniary damages" as "demonstrable economic injuries" applies in this case
because the 2005 amendment merely clarified the definition of "pecuniary damages" and,
therefore, did not alter the amount of restitution defendant was ordered to pay. See State
v. Dominguez, 1999 UT App 343, \ 11, 992 P.2d 995

ARGUMENT
BECAUSE THE 2005 AMENDMENT TO THE RESTITUTION
STATUTE ONLY CLARIFIED AND DID NOT CHANGE THE
DEFINITION OF "PECUNIARY DAMAGES," THE AMENDMENT
DID NOT INCREASE OR IN ANY WAY ALTER THE
PUNISHMENT IMPOSED.
Because the 2005 amendment to Utah's restitution statute merely clarified and did
not substantively alter the definition of "pecuniary damages," the amendment was not an
unlawful ex post facto increase in the punishment for defendant's crimes. The 2005
amendment clarifies that victims such as Safeco Insurance who suffer pecuniary damages
in the form of "demonstrable economic injury" are entitled to restitution under the statute.
Thus, the award of $10,000 in restitution to Safeco should be affirmed.
Ex post facto laws are prohibited by Article I, Section 18, of the Utah Constitution
and Article I, Section 10, of the United States Constitution. "An ex post facto law is one
that" 'punishes as a crime an act previously committed, which was innocent when done;
which makes more burdensome the punishment for a crime, after its commission; or
which deprives one charged with a crime of any defense available according to the law at
the time when the act was committed.'" Monson v. Carver, 928 P.2d 1017, 1026 (Utah
1996) (quoting Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 292 (1977)) (additional citations
omitted). However, "[w]hen the Legislature alters the penalty for a crime after a
defendant has allegedly committed the crime but before sentencing, the new statute—the
one in effect at the time of sentencing—is applied so long as 'it does not raise a
Constitutional question of being an ex post facto law by reason of increasing the
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punishment.'" State v. Dominguez, 1999 UT App 343, f 11, 992 P.2d 995 (quoting Belt v.
Turner, 25 Utah 2d 380, 483 P.2d 425, 425-26 (1971)).
When an amendment is a mere clarification, rather than a substantive change, its
application does not violate the ex post facto clause. U.S. v. Brennan, 326 F.3d 176, 197
(3 rd Cir. 2003). One way of evaluating whether an amendment merely clarifies existing
law is to determine whether the change effected by the amendment was foreseeable. See
Lustgarden v. Gunter, 966 F.2d 552, 554 (10th Cir.), cert denied, 506 U.S. 1008 (1992)
(holding the plain language of the statute dictates the revised interpretation and therefore
it is foreseeable). Where the change is foreseeable, it does not violate the prohibition on
ex post facto laws. See id.
Before the 2005 amendment, Utah's restitution statute defined "pecuniary
damages" as "all special damages, but not general damages which a person could recover
against the defendant in a civil action . .." Utah Code Ann. § 77-3 8a-102(6) (West 2004).
The Legislature amended the statute in response to criticism by Judge Orme, Utah Court
of Appeals, who wrote in a concurring opinion that use of the term "special damages" to
designate those that may be awarded as restitution and "general damages" for those that
cannot is precisely opposite to their traditional meaning. See State v. Corbitt, 2003 UT
App 417, \ 25, 82 P.3d 211 (Orme, J., concurring). As Judge Orme explained,
"Special damages include items of loss that are more or less peculiar to the
particular plaintiff and would not be expected to occur regularly to other
plaintiffs in similar circumstances. General damages, on the other hand,
are damages that courts believe 'generally' flow from the kind of
substantive wrong done by the defendant."
Id. at U 20 (quoting Dan B. Dobbs, Handbook on the Law of Remedies § 3.2, at 138-39
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(West 1973)). Because the intent of the legislature was clearly to compensate victims for
"general damages" in the form "demonstrable pecuniary loss," id. at \ 28, while
excluding "special damages" for intangibles such as "pain and suffering, id. at ^ 27,
Utah's appellate courts, in analyzing restitution claims, "have ignored the plain language
of the statute and done what the Legislature probably really intended"—i.e., allow
restitution of general damages. Id. at If 26. Judge Orme lamented, however, that such an
interpretive approach "is very much at odds with our oft-repeated objective to interpret
statutes in accordance with the plain meaning of the words used" and suggests that the
legislature take the opportunity to "adjust" the statute. Id. at ^f 28.
In 2005, the legislature accepted Judge Orme's invitation by eliminating reference
to "general" and "special" damages and instead defined the damages compensable
through restitution as "all demonstrable economic injury,.. ." Utah Code Ann. § 77-3 8a102(6) (West 2006 Supp.). The amendment, contained in Senate Bill 96, Addendum A,
was clearly intended to clarify legislative intent rather than substantively alter the statute.
The preamble to S.B. 96 states: "This bill clarifies the definition of 'pecuniary damages';
. . ." Id. Further, Sen. Gregory Bell, the bill's sponsor, reiterated that intent orally
immediately before the bill was passed unanimously by the Senate:
I failed to mention yesterday, and this is something very, very good that I
think the Legislature will appreciate, and that is that in a case that went to
the Utah Court of Appeals, Judge Orme indicated that the phraseology in
one part of the restitution bill was incorrect [and] that we had mixed up
somehow the definition of general damages and special damages. And
Judge Orme said the Legislature would probably want to amend this and
pay attention to this point. And I just thought that was an excellent way the
courts and the Legislature can cooperate, and so in fact we did amend that. .
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See Senate floor debate, January 27, 2005 (audio recording online at
wwwJetstate.ut>us/asp/audio/index.asp?Sess=2005GS&Day=0&BilHSB0094&Ho
use=S).
Clearly, the 2005 amendment to the definition of "pecuniary damages" did
not in any way alter or increase the punishment—in this case, the amount of
restitution defendant was ordered to pay—and, therefore, is not an unconstitutional
ex post facto law. Dominguez, 1999 UT App 343 at ^f 11. The amendment merely
clarified that proper restitution of "general damages," as that term has traditionally
been used and as it has been interpreted by Utah courts, see Corbitt, 2003 UT App
417, Tf 28, is better facilitated by use of the more precise phrase "demonstrable
economic injury." Utah Code Ann. § 77-3 8a-102(6). Additionally, the
amendment was foreseeable because it merely brought the definition of "pecuniary
damages" into accord with the accepted legal definitions as well as precedent from
Utah's appellate courts. See Lustgarden, 966 F.2d at 554. Accordingly, the award
of $10,000 to Safeco was proper under either the 2002 or the 2005 versions of the
statute. In any event, the current version of the statute applies because the
amendment did not change the amount of restitution defendant could be ordered to
pay and did not increase the punishment to which he was subject. This Court
should affirm the restitution award.
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 24th day of August, 2007.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF
Attorney General
BRETT J. DELPORTO
Assistant Attorney General
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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UTAH 2005 SESSION LAWS
56th LEGISLATURE, 2005 GENERAL SESSION
Copr. ©

2005 Thomson/West

Additions are indicated by Elllp; deletions by
Text. Changes in tables are made but not highlighted.
Ch. 96
S.B. 94
RESTITUTION AMENDMENTS
This bill makes changes regarding the Board of Pardons and Parole's
responsibility concerning inmate restitution. This bill clarifies the definition
of "pecuniary damages"; requires that the convicting court order restitution, if
feasible, at the time of sentencing or within one year of sentencing; and provides
that the Board of Pardons and Parole may determine restitution for an inmate if the
convicting court has not.
Utah Code Sections Affected:
AMENDS:
77-27-5, as last amended by Chapter 35, Laws of Utah 2002
77-27-6, as last amended by Chapter 35, Laws of Utah 2002
77-38a-102, as last amended by Chapter 278, Laws of Utah 2003
77-38a-203, as enacted by Chapter 137, Laws of Utah 2001
77-38a-302, as last amended by Chapter 285, Laws of Utah 2003
Be it enacted by the Legislature of the state of Utah:
Section 1. Section 77-27-5 is amended to read:
«
§

UT ST §

77-27-5

»

77-27-5. Board of Pardons and Parole authority

(1)(a) The Board of Pardons and Parole shall determine by majority decision when
and under what conditions, subject to this chapter and other laws of the state,
persons committed to serve sentences in class A misdemeanor cases at penal or
correctional facilities which are under the jurisdiction of the. Department of
Corrections, and all felony cases except treason or impeachment or as otherwise
Copr. ©

West 2007 No Claim to Orig. Govt. Works

UT LEGIS 96 (2005)
2005 Utah Laws Ch. 96 (S.B. 94)
(Publication page references are not available for this
document.)

Page 2

limited by law, may be released upon parole, pardoned,
restitutionordcrcd, or have their fines, forfeitures, or restitution remitted, or
their sentences commuted or terminated.
(b) The board may sit together or in panels to conduct hearings. The chair shall
appoint members to the panels in any combination and in accordance with rules
promulgated by the board, except in hearings involving commutation and pardons.
The chair may participate on any panel and when doing so is chair of the panel.
The chair of the board may designate the chair for any other panel.
(c) No restitution may be ordered, no fine, forfeiture, or restitution remitted,
no parole, pardon, or commutation granted or sentence terminated, except after a
full hearing before the board or the board 1 s appointed examiner in open session.
Any action taken under this subsection other than by a majority of the board shall
be affirmed by a majority of the board.
(d) A commutation or pardon may be granted only after a full hearing before the
board.
(e) The board shallfplrf determine restitution in an amount that docs not exceed
complete restitution if determined by the court in accordance with Scction|y|

(2)(a) In the case of original parole grant hearings, rehearings, and parole
revocation hearings, timely prior notice of the time and place of the hearing shall
be given to the defendant, the county or district attorney's office responsible for
prosecution of the case, the sentencing court, law enforcement officials
responsible for the defendant's arrest and conviction, and whenever possible, the
victim or the victim's family.
(b) Notice to the victim, his representative, or his family shall include
information provided in Section 77-27-9.5, and any related rules made by the board
under that section.
This information shall be provided in terms that are
reasonable for the lay person to understand.
(3) Decisions of the board in cases involving paroles, pardons, commutations or
terminations of sentence, restitution, or remission of fines or forfeitures are
final and are not subject to judicial review. Nothing in this section prevents the
obtaining or enforcement of a civil judgment, including restitution as provided in
Section 77-27-6.
(4) This chapter may not be construed as a denial of or limitation of the
governor's power to grant respite or reprieves in all cases of convictions for
offenses against the state, except treason or conviction on impeachment. However,
respites or reprieves may not extend beyond the next session of the Board of
Pardons and Parole and the board, at that session, shall continue or terminate the
respite or reprieve, or it may commute the punishment, or pardon the offense as
provided.
In the case of conviction for treason, the governor may suspend
execution of the sentence until the case is reported to the Legislature at its next
session.
The Legislature shall then either pardon or commute the sentence, or
direct its execution.
(5) In determining when, where, and under what conditions offenders serving
sentences may be paroled, pardoned, have restitution ordered, or have their fines

Copr. ©
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or forfeitures remitted, or their sentences commuted or terminated, the board shall
consider whether the persons have made or are prepared to make restitution as
ascertained in accordance with the standards and procedures of Section 77-38a-302,
as a condition of any parole, pardon, remission of fines or forfeitures, or
commutation or termination of sentence.
(6) In determining whether parole may be terminated, the board shall consider the
offense committed by the parolee, the parole period as provided in Section 76-3202, and in accordance with Section 77-27-13.
Section 2. Section 77-27-6 is amended to read:
«
§

UT ST §

77-27-6

»

77-27-6. Payment of restitution

(1) When the Board of Pardons and Parole orders the release on parole of an inmate
who has been sentenced to make restitution pursuant to Title 77, Chapter 38a, Crime
Victims Restitution Act, or whom the board has ordered to make restitution, and all
or a portion of restitution is still owing, the board may establish a schedule,
including both complete and court-ordered restitution, by which payment of the
restitution shall be made, or order compensatory or other service in lieu of or in
combination with restitution. In fixing the schedule and supervising the paroled
offender's performance, the board may consider the factors specified in Section 7738a-302.
(2)113 The board may impose any court order for restitutionand§
fb);£j^
order that
a defendant make restitution m an amount not to exceed thcflfl pecuniary damages te
the victim of the offense of which the defendant has been convicted,—the victim of
any other criminal conduct admitted to by the defendant to the sentencing court,—e*?
for conduct for which the defendant has agreed to make restitution as part of a
plea a q r c c m c n t O i i l S ^ ^ i | S g ^ ^ ^ ^ ™ ^ ^ S 5 ' ^ S S ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ / ' unless the board applying the
criteria as set forth in Section 77-38a-302 determines that restitution is
inappropriate.

j(d) ,If,r upon termination* or^expxja^raoW^of^^def endantjr sr sentence?^ 9ie^ board? ha§
continuing jurisdiction oyer the defendant„ for^a^s'eparatej criminal- offense,„ th4
board may defer making an order^ of_resti.tut
or, e ^ ^ ^ ^ K ^ ^ ^ S
'£lJL.Lsj§lCe^
(3) The board may also make orders of restitution for recovery of any or all costs
incurred by the Department of Corrections or the state or any other agency arising
out of the defendant's needs or conduct.

Copr. ©
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( P u b l i c a t i o n page r e f e r e n c e s are not a v a i l a b l e f o r t h i s
document.)
c o l l e c t i o n r e m e d i e s . The Board of P a r d o n s ' a n d P a r o l e s h a l l forward a r e s t i t u t i o n
o r d e r t o t h e s e n t e n c i n g c o u r t t o be e n t e r e d on t h e judgment d o c k e t . The entrys h a l l c o n s t i t u t e a l i e n and i s s u b j e c t t o t h e same r u l e s as a judgment for money i n
a c i v i l judgment.
S e c t i o n 3 . S e c t i o n 77-38a-102 i s amended t o r e a d :
«
§

UT ST §

77-38a-102

»

77-38a-102. D e f i n i t i o n s

As used i n t h i s c h a p t e r :
(1) "Conviction" includes a:
(a) judgment of guilt;
(b) a plea of guilty;

or

(c) a plea of no contest.
(2) "Criminal activities" means any offense of which the defendant is convicted or
any other criminal conduct for which the defendant admits responsibility to the
sentencing court with or without an admission of committing the criminal conduct.
(3) "Department" means the Department of Corrections.
(4) "Diversion" means suspending criminal proceedings prior to conviction on the
condition that a defendant agree to participate in a rehabilitation program, make
restitution to the victim, or fulfill some other condition.
(5) "Party" means the prosecutor, defendant, or department involved in a
prosecution.
(6) "Pecuniary damages" means all special damages,—but not general damages,
gejionstrable;^
which a person could
recover against the defendantin a civil action arising out of the facts or events
constituting the defendant's criminal activities and includes the money
equivalent!faJS^JSSXSeW^53^B of property taken, destroyed, broken, or otherwise
harmed, and losses includingffcSjplearnings and medical e x p e n s e s W ^ u ^ ^ ^ ^ S 2 \ i S e s ,
purfajfc^
.
(7) "Plea agreement" means an agreement entered between the prosecution and
defendant setting forth the special terms and conditions and criminal charges upon
which the defendant will enter a plea of guilty or no contest.
(8) "Plea in abeyance" means an order by a court, upon motion of the prosecution
and the defendant, accepting a plea of guilty or of no contest from the defendant
but not, at that time, entering judgment of conviction against him nor imposing
sentence upon him on condition that he comply with specific conditions as set forth
in a plea in abeyance agreement.
(9) "Plea in abeyance agreement" means an agreement entered into between the
prosecution and the defendant setting forth the specific terms and conditions upon

Copr. ©
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which, following acceptance of the agreement by the court, a plea may be held in'
abeyance.
(10) "Plea disposition" means an agreement entered into between the prosecution
and defendant including diversion, plea agreement, plea in abeyance agreement, or
any agreement by which the defendant may enter a plea in any other jurisdiction or
where charges are dismissed without a plea.
(11) "Restitution" means full, partial, or nominal payment for pecuniary damages
to a victim, including prejudgment interest, the accrual of interest from the time
of sentencing, insured damages, reimbursement for payment of a reward, and payment
for expenses to a governmental entity for extradition or transportation and as may
be further defined by law.
(12)(a) "Reward" means a sum of money:
(i) offered to the public for information leading to the arrest and conviction
of an offender; and
(ii) that has been paid to a person or persons who provide this information,
except that the person receiving the payment may not be a codefendant, an
accomplice, or a bounty hunter.
(b) "Reward" does not include any amount paid in excess of the sum offered to the
public.
(13) "Screening" means the process used by a prosecuting attorney to terminate
investigative action, proceed with prosecution, move to dismiss a prosecution that
has been commenced, or cause a prosecution to be diverted.
(14)(a) "Victim" means any person whom the court determines has suffered pecuniary
damages as a result of the defendant's criminal activities.
(b) "Victim" may not include a codefendant or accomplice.
Section 4. Section 77-38a-203 is amended to read:
«

UT ST §

77-38a-203

»

§ 77-38a-203. Restitution determination—Department of Corrections—Presentence
investigation
(1)(a) The department shall prepare a presentence investigation report in
accordance with Subsection 77-18-1(5). The prosecutor and law enforcement agency
involved shall provide all available victim information to the department upon
request. The victim impact statement shall:
(i) identify all victims of the offense;
(ii) itemize any economic loss suffered by the victim as a result of the
offense;
(iii) include for each identifiable victim a specific statement of the
recommended amount of complete restitution as defined in Section 77-38a-302,
Copr. ©
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accompanied by a recommendation from the department regarding the payment by the
defendant of. court-ordered restitution with interest as defined in Section 77-38a302;
(iv) identify any physical, mental, or emotional injuries suffered by the victim
as a result of the offense, and the seriousness and permanence;
(v) describe any change in the victimTs personal welfare or familial
relationships as a result of the offense;
(vi) identify any request for mental health services initiated by the victim or
the victim's family as a result of the offense; and
(vii) contain any other information related to the impact of the offense upon
the victim or the victim's family that the court requires.
(b) The crime victim shall be responsible to provide to the department upon
request all invoices, bills, receipts, and other evidence of injury, loss of
earnings, and out-of-pocket loss. The crime victim shall also provide upon
request:
(i) all documentation and evidence of compensation or reimbursement from
insurance companies or agencies of the state of Utah, any other state, or federal
government received as a direct result of the crime for injury, loss, earnings, or
out-of-pocket loss; and
(ii) proof of identification, including date of birth, Social Security number,
drivers license number, next of kin, and home and work address and telephone
numbers.
(c) The inability, failure, or refusal of the crime victim to provide all or part
of the requested information shall result in the court determining restitution
based on the best information available.
(2)(a) The court shall order the defendant as part of the presentence
investigation to submit to the department any information determined necessary to
be disclosed for the purpose of ascertaining the restitution.
(b) The willful failure or refusal of the defendant to provide all or part of the
requisite information shall constitute a waiver of any grounds to appeal or seek
future amendment or alteration of the restitution order predicated on the
undisclosed information.
(c) If the defendant objects to the imposition, amount, or distribution of the
restitution recommended in the presentence investigation, or if the department is
unable to determine the restitution for any reason, the court shall set a hearing
date to resolve the matter.
(d) If any party fails to challenge the accuracy of the presentence investigation
report at the time of sentencing, that matter shall be considered to be waived.
Section 5. Section 77-38a-302 is amended to read:
«
Copr. ©

UT ST §

77-38a-302

»
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77-38a-302. Restitution criteria

(1) When a defendant is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted in
pecuniary damages, in addition to any other sentence it may impose, the court shall
order that the defendant make restitution to victims of crime as provided in this
chapter, or for conduct for which the defendant has agreed to make restitution as
part of a plea disposition.
For purposes of restitution, a victim has the meaning
as defined in Subsection 7 7-38a~102-fii-)-^^3 and in determining whether restitution
is appropriate, the court shall follow the criteria and procedures as provided in
Subsections (2) through (5).
(2) In determining restitution, the court shall determine complete restitution and
court-ordered restitution.
(a) "Complete restitution" means restitution necessary to compensate a victim for
all losses caused by the defendant.
(b) "Court-ordered restitution" means the restitution the court having criminal
jurisdiction orders the defendant to pay as a part of the criminal sentence at the

time of sentencing E ^ ^ S ^ H ^ ^ g ^ g l ^ i ^ ^ l ^ l e ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ l •
(c) Complete restitution and court-ordered restitution shall be determined as
provided in Subsection (5).
(3) If the court determines that restitution is appropriate or inappropriate under
this part, the court shall make the reasons for the decision part of the court
record.
(4) If the defendant objects to the imposition, amount, or distribution of the
restitution, the court shall at the time of Gcntcncingallow the defendant a full
hearing on the issue.
(5)(a) For the purpose of determining restitution for an offense, the offense
shall include any criminal conduct admitted by the defendant to the sentencing
court or to which the defendant agrees to pay restitution. A victim of an offense
that involves as an element a scheme, a conspiracy, or a pattern of criminal
activity, includes any person directly harmed by the defendant's criminal conduct
in the course of the scheme, conspiracy, or pattern.
(b) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for complete
restitution, the court shall consider all relevant facts, including:
(i) the cost of the damage or loss if the offense resulted in damage to or loss
or destruction of property of a victim of the offense;
(ii) the cost of necessary medical and related professional services and devices
relating to physical or mental health care, including nonmedical care and treatment
rendered in accordance with a method of healing recognized by the law of the place
of treatment;
(iii) the cost of necessary physical and occupational therapy and
rehabilitation;
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(iv) the income lost by the victim as a result of the offense if the offense
resulted in bodily injury to a victim;
(v) up to five days of the individual victim1s determinable wages that are lost
due to theft of or damage to tools or equipment items of a trade that were owned by
the victim and were essential to the victim's current employment at the time of the
offense; and
(vi) the cost of necessary funeral and related services if the offense resulted
in the death of a victim.
(c) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for court-ordered
restitution, the court shall consider the factors listed in Subsections (5)(a) and
(b) and:
(i) the financial resources of the defendant and the burden that payment of
restitution will impose, with regard to the other obligations of the defendant;
(ii) the ability of the defendant to pay restitution on an installment basis or
on other conditions to be fixed by the court;
(iii) the rehabilitative effect on the defendant of the payment of restitution
and the method of payment; and
(iv) other circumstances which the court determines may make restitution
inappropriate.
-£4-)—The court may decline to make an order or may defer entering an order of
restitution if the court determines that the complication and prolongation of the
sentencing process,—as a result of considering an order of restitution under this
Subsection—(-S-H—substantially outweighs the need to provide restitution to the
victim.

Effective May 2, 2005.
Approved March 11, 2005
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END OF DOCUMENT

Copr. ©

West 2007 No Claim to Orig. Govt. Works

